This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Saetnan, A. R. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear?

Assessing Technologies for Diagnosis of Security Risks

Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim

Demand for surveillance technologies often assumes that these technologies would accurately identify those guilty of crimes and only those guilty of crimes. But how accurate are surveillance technologies as "diagnostic" tools? Surveillance technologies have not been tested for accuracy in the manner we expect for medical diagnostic technologies. Tests of medical technologies are designed to address sensitivity (How many of those affected by a disease does the test identify?) and specificity (How many unaffected by the disease does the test show as healthy?). Even for tests with more than 90% sensitivity and specificity, the majority of test positive results are false. Using value estimates for facial recognition and DNA identification, this article estimates the answers to these questions for crime surveillance technologies. The vast majority of test positive results would be false. In other words, even those of us with "nothing to hide" may have much to fear from crime surveillance technologies.

Key Words: forensic technology assessment • false positive • predictive value

International Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, 193-206 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1057567707306651


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?